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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Validity of Segregation in Pub-
lic Schools. Plaintiffs, Negro school children, sought a declar-
atory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that schools and
educational facilities provided for Negro children in School
District No. 22, Clarendon County, South Carolina, were in-
ferior to those provided for white children in that district
and that this amounted to a denial of the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed them by the Fourteenth amendment, and
further that the segregation of Negro and white children in
the public schools was in and of itself a denial of equal pro-
tection. HELD, where separate schools are maintained for
Negroes and whites, the educational facilities afforded by
them must be equal, but if equal facilities are offered, segre-
gation of the races in the schools is not of itself a denial of
the equal protection of the laws prescribed by the Fourteenth
amendment. Briggs v. Elliott, 20 U. S. L. Week 2015 (E. D.
S. C. June 23, 1951).
In a decision cited in the instant case as directly controlling,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right and power of the
state to regulate the method of providing for the education of
its youth, even though such regulation included segregation.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927). The Gong Lum opinion
was based on state and lower federal court decisions upholding
the right of a state to require segregation in the schools.
Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198 (1849) ; Ward
v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17
Am. Rep. 738 (1874); People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 45
Am. Rep. 232 (1883); Wong Him v. Callhan, 11D F. 381
(C. C. N. D. Cal. 1902). "Constitutional invalidity does not
arise from the mere fact of separation .. ." Carr v. Corning,
182 F. 2d 14, 17 (D. C. Cir. 1950). And the doctrine that seg-
regation is a political rather than a judicial problem was
reiterated in a decision involving the petition of a Negro to
enter the Law School of the University of South Carolina.
Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E. D. S. C.
1947). However, the constitutionality of present-day segrega-
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tion provisions is directly dependent upon the Plessy doctrine
of "separate but equal" facilities. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.
537 (1896). And from the earlier cases cited above to the more
recent decisions based on the Plessy doctrine, separation of
the races was validated by, and its validity was dependent
upon, the equality of the separate facilities and opportunities.
People v. Gallagher, supra; Ward v. Flood, supra; Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; Sipuel v. University of Okla-
homa, 332 U. S. 631 (1948); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 TU. S. 637 (1950). Further, the right to the equal
protection of the law being an individual and personal right,
the requirement of equality is met only where the same, or
equivalent, treatment is accorded to persons of different races
similarly situated. (Italics added.) McCabe v. Atchison, To-
peka, and Sante Fe Railroad Co., 235 U. S. 151 (1914) ; Cor-
bin v. School Board of Pulaski County, 177 F. 2d 924 (4th
Cir. 1949). But equality does not require that privileges be
provided members of the two races in the same place. (Italics
added.) "The state may choose the method by which equality
is maintained." Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590,
103 A. L. R. 706, 711 (1936). In so choosing the method, the
state must furnish the equal facilities and opportunities with-
in its own borders. Gaines v. Canada, supra.
Htowever, as an indication that the current status of the
Plessy doctrine is not free of doubt, the Supreme Court has
interpreted "equality," in law school cases, to include many
intangible qualities, such as reputation of faculty, position
and influence of alumni, traditions and prestige, and associa-
tion with present and future members of the profession.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) ; McKissick v. Car-
michael, 187 F. 2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951). Further, the decisions
deeming it to be a denial of equal protection for a state or
federal court to attempt to enforce private restrictive cove-
nants must be noted in considering the present status of the
"separate but equal" doctrine. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S.
1 (1948) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948). But when the
cases immediately above were utilized in an argument that
the Plessy case has been weakened by these subsequent de-
cisions, a lower federal court replied: "We are not at liberty to
disregard a decision of the Supreme Court which that court
has not seen fit to overrule and which it expressly refrained
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from re-examining (See Sweatt v. Painter, supra)." Boyer v.
Garrett, 183 F. 2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950).
The decision in the instant case is undoubtedly in full ac-
cord with the "separate but equal" doctrine, both as to the
decree ordering equalization and the denial of plaintiffs' con-
tentions against segregation. However, in view of the court's
recent decisions noted above, the fate of this case upon its
impending appeal to the Supreme Court is a matter of wide
discussion and notable variety of opinion. The Sweatt de-
cision indicates that the "equality," which validates separa-
tion, may be measured, at least on the graduate and profes-
sional school level, by such strict standards as to be impos-
sible of achievement. And further, it would seem to be only
a logical extension of the principle of the much-criticized
Kraemer decision to declare segregation itself to be unconsti-
tutional. It is the oft-expressed view that in the Kraemer case
and to some extent in the Sweatt case, the court erred in find-
ing questions of constitutional rights in controversies smelling
more of public policy.
FRANCIS B. NICHOLSON
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-Last Clear Chance Doctrine in
South Carolina. Plaintiff's intestate, while helpless under the
influence of intoxicants, was sitting in a stooped position on
a cross tie of the defendant's track. The defendant's locomo-
tive, equipped with a headlight and oscillating Mars light,
and affording a full view of the track, gave no warning signals
after passing a public crossing 1,025 feet from the place where
the deceased was sitting. The track was straight for 3,600
feet, and it was shown that the plaintiff's intestate was near
several paths which had been in use by the public for over
twenty years with the acquiescence of the defendant. When
some six or seven hundred feet from the deceased, the crew
of the train saw him, but believing him to be a piece of paper
or cardboard, failed to slacken speed or sound any warning.
Not until the engine was approximately two hundred feet
from the deceased did they determine that it was a human be-
ing on the track and apply brakes. Still no signals were given,
and the last of the eight cars had passed the spot where the
deceased was sitting before the train was finally stopped. The
lower court found for the plaintiff and awarded damages
3
et al.: RECENT CASES
Published by Scholar Commons, 1951
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
of $5,000.00 for wrongful death. On appeal, HELD, affirmed.
Under the doctrine of the last clear chance a railroad com-
pany is under a duty to keep a reasonable lookout for obstruc-
tions on its track, and if the direct and proximate cause of an
injury is the negligence of the railroad in failing to keep a
reasonable lookout and discover helpless persons on its track
in time to prevent the injury, it is liable. Jones v. Atlanta-
Charlotte Air Line R. Co., et at., 218 S. C. 537, 63 S. E. (2d)
476 (1951).
The reasoning employed in the instant case is the same as
that used in Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 548, 152 Eng. Re-
prints 588, 17 Eng. Rul. Case Law 190 (1842), wherein the
court upheld a charge of the trial judge to the effect that,
although the plaintiff was negligent in fettering his donkey
on the highway, if the proximate cause of the injury was
attributable to the want of proper conduct on the part of the
driver of the wagon, or if the collision might have been avoided
by the exercise of ordinary care on his part, the action was
maintainable against the defendant. Among the early South
Carolina decisions adopting this view, was Farley v. Charles-
ton Basket & Veneer Co., 51 S. C. 222, 28 S. E. 193 (1897),
which held that although the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, if the proximate cause of the injury was the
failure of the defendant to exercise reasonable care and pru-
dence to avoid the injury, plaintiff would be entitled to re-
cover. Another celebrated early case found, on the basis of
proximate cause, that a railroad company is not bound to
slacken the speed of its train upon seeing someone approach
its track unless the circumstances indicate that he does not,
or cannot, see the train, or unless there is some reason which
would induce a reasonable engineer under similar circum-
stances, to slacken his speed. Fletcher v. South Carolina &
Georgia Extension R. R. Co., 57 S. E. 205, 35 S. E. 513 (1899).
When there is negligence on the part of the injured person,
and ordinary care on the part of the one inflicting the injury
would have discovered such carelessness in time to prevent
the injury, there is no contributory negligence, because the
fault of the one injured becomes remote in the chain of causa-
tion and the want of ordinary care on the latter's part is held
not a proximate cause of his injury. Bodie v. Charleston and
Western Carolina Ry. Co., 61 S. C. 468, 39r S. E. 715 (1901).
The proximate cause rule has been adopted in a number of
ISO
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cases, notably Kirkland v. Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Electric Corp.,
97 S. C. 61, 81 S. E. 306 (1913). By way of dicta, the court
repudiated this reasoning by declaring a judge's charge that
"even though the plaintiff was negligent, yet if the defend-
ant's servant saw the plaintiff in time to avoid the collision,
plaintiff might still recover" to be the doctrine of "the last
clear chance" and not the law in this state. Spillers v. Griffen,
109 S. C. 78, 95 S. E. 133 (1917). Quoting The Spillers Case,
the Court again denied its application in Blackwell v. First
National Bank of Columbia, 185 S. C. 427, 194 S. E. 339
(1934). However, that same year the court held non-prej-
udicial a charge that if the defendant could have avoided the
injury by exercising due diligence in performing his duties,
and in keeping a reasonable lookout ahead, so as to discover
the plaintiff in time to avoid injuring him, but failed to do
so, then such failure and not the negligence of the plaintiff
formed the main and proximate cause of the injury. Leppard
v. Southern Ry. Co., et al., 174 S. C. 237, 177 S. E. 129 (1934).
The court generally followed this reasoning in subsequent de-
cisions, including Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolint Division,
205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133 (1945) and Nettles v. South-
ern Ry. Co., 211 S. C. 187, 44 S. E. (2d) 321 (1947), until,
by way of dicta, the court said the definition of "the last clear
chance doctrine" found in 2 Restatement, Torts, § 480, was
"sound law." Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, 212 S. C. 485, 48
S. E. (2d) 324 (1948). In the instant case, the court for the
first time invoked the "last clear chance doctrine" by name,
asserting that the defendant's belief that it was not the law
in this State was in error. Jones v. Ry., supra.
The doctrine of "the last clear chance" in South Carolina
seems to be merely a phase of the theory of proximate cause,
and not an exception to the rule of contributory negligence.
Denied twice by dicta, it has apparently been in force in this
State under the guise of "proximate cause" since well before
the turn of the centurr, and it is difficult to understand the
antipathetic attitude of the court toward the use of the name
"last clear chance" prior to this year. However, the instant
case has resolved all doubt as to the position of the court on
this theory and has made the doctrine of the "last clear chance"
officially a part of the law of South Carolina.
ROBERT R. CARPENTER
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INSURANCE-Presumption of Death After Seven Years
Absence. Insured had been making frequent visits to the
home of his niece where he received monthly checks from his
brother and also kept some of his personal belongings. He
had been employed by the Chevrolet Company at which time
he had been insured by Defendant under a group policy, nam-
ing his niece as beneficiary. On May 1, 1941, the insured dis-
appeared and in June his niece made a thorough search for
him, interviewing the owner of a small cafe where the in-
sured cashed checks and also where he ate. No checks were
cashed after April. She enlisted the aid of the police authori-
ties. Meeting with no success, niece, on October 6, 1943, fur-
nished defendant with four affidavits containing all the avail-
able information concerning the disappearance and alleged
death of the insured. Defendant's inspectors then made a
search but with no success. Defendant contended that the pol-
icy had lapsed on May 30, 1941, and as it had not been proven
that insured had died prior to that time, defendant refused
to pay the claim. Niece assigned her rights to the insured's
brother (who died) and his administrator brings action to
collect the insurance. The lower court directed a verdict for
the defendant holding that there was no evidence from which
the jury could conclude that the insured died before the policy
lapsed for non-payment. On appeal, HELD, reversed; where
one has disappeared and has not been heard of for seven years
by those who would ordinarily hear, the question as to the
time of death is for the jury. Ligon v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company, - S. C. - , 64 S. E. 2d 258 (1951)
The conception of the presumption of death after seven
years of unexplained absence was first found in 1603 in a
statute which exempted from the punishment of bigamy those
marrying again when their spouses had been beyond the seas
for seven years with no report of them. 1 James 1, cll. A later
statute decreed in 1667 that if an estate depends on the life
of a person who remained beyond the seas or absented him-
self elsewhere in the kingdom for seven years, in an action
by a lessor to recover an estate, such a person was accounted
dead. 19 Charles 2nd, c6. There was no general presumption
of death from such an absence until Lord Ellenborough ex-
panded these two statutes and held that a presumption that
the duration of life ends at the expiration of seven years with
respect to persons of whom no account can be given. Doe v.
6
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Jesson, 6 East 80 (1805). Four years later Lord Ellenborough
held that the burden is on the one alleging life to show that
the one missing is still alive. Hopewell v. DePinna, 2 Camp
113 (1809). From these two statutes and these two cases de-
veloped the rule that death is presumed at the expiration of
seven years unexplained absence. Phillips on Evidence (2nd
ed.) p. 152 (1815). South Carolina has adopted the rule hold-
ing that one absent seven years without being heard from is
presumed dead. Burns v. Ford, 1 Bailey 507 (1830). The pre-
sumption of death from seven years unexplained absence pre-
vails over the presumption of the continuance of life. Day v.
Day, 216 S. C. 334, 58 S. E. 2d 83 (1950). The rule that seven
years continued absence raises a presumption of death is part
of our "public policy". Dill v. Sovereign Camp W. 0. W., 202
S. C. 401, 25 S. E. 285 (1943). A lapse of seven years from
the date of last known information raises a presumption of
death and the absentee is presumed alive for the seven year
period unless the facts and circumstances indicate a shorter
period. Canaday v. George, 6 Rich. Eq. 103 (1853). One desir-
ing to show that one who has been absent seven years without
being heard from, died before the' end of the period, may, by
showing special facts and circumstances, establish death at
an earlier time. The Praetorians v. Phillips, 184 Okla. 521, 88
P. 2d 647 (1939). The burden of proof is on the one who
undertakes to overthrow the presumption of death. Chapman
v. Cooper, 5 Rich. 452 (1852). The presumption arising after
seven years' absence is a presumption of death, not as to the
time of death. Ingram v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, 37 Ga. App. 206, 139 S. E. 363 (1927). Whether death
occurred at the beginning or the end of the seven-year period
is to be determined from the facts of each particular case
and the burden of proof is on the one whose interest it is to
fix the time of death prior to the expiration of the period.
Corley v. Holloway, 22 S. C. 380 (1885). Evidence relating to
character, habits, conditions, affections, attachments, pros-
perity, and other objects in life which are motives of men's
actions are evidence from which you can infer the death of
the absentee, whatever the duration of the absence. Tisdale v.
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, 26 Iowa 170,
96 Am. Dec. 136 (1868). The character of the insured, man-
ner of his life and his relationship to his family taken with
the circumstances of his disappearance constitute evidence to
7
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justify the jury in finding that the absentee died at the com-
mencement of his disappearance. Behimer v. Grand Lodge of
A. 0. U. W. of Minnesota, 109 Minn. 305, 123 N. W. 1071
(1909). Evidence showing missing person was a devoted hus-
band and father, happy in his home life, sober, respected in
his community, raises a presumption that he died a short time
after his dissappearance. Sovereign Camp of Woodman of the
World v. Robinson, 187 S. W. 215 (1916). Death of the absent
one may be presumed where the evidence consists of facts and
circumstances, other than exposure, which could result in his
death without regard to the duration of the absence and at
some time prior to the expiration of the seven year period.
Kansas City Life Insurance Company v. Marshall, 84 Colo. 71,
268 P. 529 (1928). It might be conceded that if the testimony
is not legally sufficient to support a finding that the absentee
died the very day of his disappearance, and yet, if the testi-
mony is sufficient to support a finding, that finding could be
that he died a short time after his disappearance. American
National Insurance Company v. Hicks, 35 S. W. 2d 128 (1931).
Death may be proved by circumstantial evidence but to prove
death at a particular time the evidence must prove it is more
probable that the insured died at a particular time than that
he survived. Free v. Life Insurance Company of Virginia, 176
S, C. 295, 180 S. E. 28 (1938). A person in bad health, walk-
ing near a lake, died at the date of his disappearance although
the seven-year period had not lapsed. Jacobson v. Jacobson,
56 N. Y. S. 2d 588 (1945).
The results reached in this case are in accord with the mod-
ern trend. With our modern facilities, it is difficult for one
to completely disappear unless death occurs. An absence for
seven years is not prima facie evidence that the absentee died
at any particular time but must be determined from the facts
of each particular case. Under suspicious circumstances one
could presume that an absentee is concealing his identity but,
as in this case, where a man leaves his loved ones and leaves
his only means of livelihood without notifying them, one could
reach a logical conclusion that he died immediately following
his disappearance. Burden should be on the defendant to prove
that the absentee still lives or that he died in the latter part
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1951], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss1/7
RECENT CASES
of the period. But if death is proved at the beginning of the
missing period, what effect would the Statute of Limitations
have on it?
E. C. BURNETT, JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Interference With Jury Trial.
Petitioners, four Negroes accused of raping a white girl, had
to be transferred, after arrest, from the county jail to the
state prison to protect them from a mob. After the arrest and
prior to the trial, mob violence reigned in the county. The in-
cidents of violence were reported in the newspapers and this
further incensed the mob. The sheriff of the county informed
the newspapers that the prisoners had confessed to the crime,
but no confession was produced at the trial. Special precau-
tions had to be exercised at the trial to provide for the safety
of the prisoners. In the lower court the defendants were found
guilty and sentenced to death. On appeal, HELD: reversed.
When a trial is conducted in such an atmosphere of public
hostility and prejudice that a fair trial cannot be had, it is a
denial of due process of law. Shepherd v. Florida, 19 L. Week
4207 (1950).
The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States forbids a state from taking one's life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. A fair and impartial
trial is one of the inherent rights embodied in the fourteenth
amendment and protected from abridgement by the states.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1939). This fair and im-
partial trial has been defined as a trial before an impartial
judge, an impartial jury, and in an atmosphere of judicial
calm. See Goldstein v. U. S., 63 F. 2d 609, 613 (C. C. A. Mo.
1933). Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through
the use of the radio, meeting halls, and newspapers, for the
very word "trial" connotes decision on the evidence and argu-
ments properly advanced in open court. Bridges v. California,
314 U. S. 252 (1941). In the case of Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U. S. 278 (1935), the court held a confession to be invalid
when obtained through brutal treatment of a mob. This case
relied heavily on a statement by Justice Holmes: "But if the
case is that the whole proceeding is a mask-that counsel,
jury, and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible
wave of public passion, and that the state court failed to cor-
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rect the wrong-neither perfection in the machinery for cor-
rection nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw
no other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob
can prevent this court from securing to the petitioners their
constitutional rights." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
The Supreme Court has not laid down any definition of mob
domination, nor any rule by which one may determine when
there has been mob domination of a trial. The Circuit Court
of Appeals has passed on the question several times, but did
not lay down any set rule to guide in determining whether or
not there has been mob domination. In many of these cases
the Supreme Court has denied Certiorari. A person on trial
for a serious crime is entitled to more than a mere pretense
of a trial; and if the trial is so dominated by mob violence
that there is actual interference with the court, and the state
carries into effect a judgment of imprisonment based upon a
verdict from such proceedings, the state deprives the person
of his liberty without due process of law. Wilson v. Lanagan,
19 F. Supp. 870 (1937), affirmed, 99 F. 2d 544 (1 Cir. 1938),
cert. den'd, 306 U. S. 634 (1939). It was held to be a denial
of due process of law in Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. 2d 586 (5
Cir. 1931), when a state court, dominated by mob violence,
returned the death sentence against one accused of rape. And
in the case of Carruthers v. Reed, 102 F. 2d 933 (8 Cir. 1939)
cert. den'd, 307 U. S. 643 (1939), the court said it is a de-
privation of life or liberty when one is executed or imprisoned
under a conviction produced at a trial influenced by mob vio-
lence.
The result in the instant case is in accord with the great
weight of authority. Though the Supreme Court has never
laid down a rule to measure mob domination, Justice Holmes
said in a dissenting opinion that mob domination is present
when a judge admits to himself that the prisoner would not
be safe if the verdict was for acquittal. This gives rise to an
overwhelming presumption that the jury has responded to
the passions of the mob. Dissent in Frank v. Mangum, 237
U. S. 309 (1914). The fact that the supreme court has re-
fused certiorari in cases of mob domination seems to indicate
that the Circuit Courts have ruled correctly in regards to
cases of this ldnd. A trial dominated by a mob is a denial of
due process of law, for every essential of a fair and impartial
10
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trial is missing. Neither the judge nor the jury can avoid
being impregnated with the environing atmosphere. Mob vio-
lence is the remotest point from judicial calm.
WILEY M. CRAFT
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